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Abstract— We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algo-
rithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium
problem in aggregative games with coupling constraints. Specifi-
cally, we focus on a single-leader, multiple-follower problem, and
after equivalently recasting the Stackelberg game as a mathe-
matical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC), we
iteratively convexify a regularized version of the MPCC as inner
problem, whose solution generates a sequence of feasible descent
directions for the original MPCC. Thus, by pursuing a descent
direction at every outer iteration, we establish convergence to a
local Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the proposed algorithm is
tested on a numerical case study involving a hierarchical instance
of the charging coordination of Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs).
Index Terms— Stackelberg equilibrium, game theory, hi-
erarchical systems, optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stackelberg equilibrium problems are very popular within the
system-and-control community, since they offer a multi-agent,
decision-making framework that enables to model not only “horizon-
tal” but also “vertical” interdependent relationships among heteroge-
neous agents, which are therefore clustered into leaders and followers.
The application domains of Stackelberg equilibrium problems are,
indeed, numerous, spanning from wireless networks, telecommunica-
tions [1], and network security [2], to demand response and energy
management [3]–[5], economics [6], and traffic control [7].
In its most general setting, a Stackelberg equilibrium problem
between a leader and a set of followers can be formulated as a
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [8, §1.2]
or, in some specific cases, as an MPCC [9]. Both MPECs and MPCCs
are usually challenging to solve. Specifically, they are inherently ill-
posed, nonconvex optimization problems, since typically there are
no feasible solutions strictly lying in the interior of the feasible
set, which may even be disconnected, implying that any constraint
qualification is violated at every feasible point [10]. It follows that, in
this context, the basic convergence assumptions characterizing stan-
dard constrained optimization algorithms are not satisfied. Therefore,
available solution methods are either tailored to the specific problem
considered, or designed ad hoc for a sub-class of MPECs/MPCCs.
Algorithmic solution techniques for the class of games involving
dominant and nondominant strategies, i.e. leaders and followers,
trace back to the 70s. For example, open-loop and feedback control
policies for differential, hence continuous-time, unconstrained games
were designed in [11], [12], while in [13] a comparison between
finite/infinite horizon control strategies involving discrete-time dy-
namics was proposed. More recently, a single-leader, multi-follower
differential game, modeling a pricing scheme for the Internet by
basing on the bandwidth usage of the users, i.e., with congestion
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constraints, was solved in [14], and an iterative procedure to compute
a Stackelberg-Nash-saddle point for an unconstrained, single-leader,
multi-follower game with discrete-time dynamics was proposed in
[15]. By relying on the uniqueness of the followers’ equilibrium
for each leader’s strategy, standard fixed-point algorithms are also
proposed in [16], [17]. A first attempt to solve an MPEC modelling
a more elaborated multi-leader, multi-follower game, was investigated
in [18]. Specifically, the authors established the equivalence to a
single-leader, multi-follower game whenever the cost functions of the
leaders admit a potential function and, in addition, the set of leaders
has an identical conjecture or estimate on the follower equilibrium.
Similar arguments are also exploited in [19] to address the same
multi-leader, multi-follower equilibrium problem. In this latter case,
for each leader, the authors proposed a single-leader, multi-follower
game modelled as an MPEC. On the other hand, all these sub-
games, which are parametric in the decisions of the followers, are
coupled together through a game against the leaders themselves.
However, in both papers the solution to the single-leader, multi-
follower game remains to be dealt with, mainly due to the presence
of nonconvexities and equilibrium/complementarity constraints which
characterize MPEC/MPCC. Early algorithmic works on MPCCs to
solve single-leader, multi-follower Stackelberg games, such as Gauss-
Seidel or Jacobi [20], [21], are computationally expensive, especially
for large number of followers. Additionally, they introduce several
privacy issues, since they are designed by relying on diagonalization
techniques. In [22], after relaxing the complementarity conditions, a
solution to an MPCC is computed through nonlinear complementarity
problems, towards driving the relaxation parameter to zero.
Our work aims at filling the apparent lack in the aforementioned
literature of scalable and privacy preserving solution algorithms for
equilibrium problems with nonconvex data and complementarity
conditions, i.e., MPECs/MPCCs. Specifically, we leverage on the
sequential convex approximation (SCA) to design a two-layer, semi-
decentralized algorithm suitable to iteratively compute a local solu-
tion to the Stackelberg equilibrium problem involving a single leader
and multiple followers in aggregative form with coupling constraints.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
• We reformulate the Stackelberg game as an MPCC by em-
bedding it into the leader nonconvex optimization problem the
equivalent KKT conditions to compute a generalized variational
Nash equilbrium (v-GNE) [23] for the followers’ game (§II);
• We exploit a key result provided in [24] to locally relax the
complementarity constraints, obtaining the MPCC-LICQ [25,
Def. 3.1], i.e., the linear independent constraint qualification
(LICQ) of all the points inside a certain neighborhood of the
originally formulated MPCC (§III);
• Along the same lines of [26], [27], we propose to convexify
the relaxed MPCC at every iteration of the outer loop, whose
optimal solution, computed within the inner loop, points a
descent direction for the cost function of the original MPCC. By
pursuing such a descent direction, the sequence of feasible points
generated by the outer loop directly leads to a local solution of
the Stackelberg equilibrium problem (§III);
• We analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm applied
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2to a numerical instance of the charging coordination problem
for a fleet of PEVs, also investigating the behavior of the leader
and the followers as the regularization parameter varies (§IV).
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed two-layer algorithm
represents the first attempt to compute a local solution to the Stackel-
berg equilibrium problem involving nonconvex data and equilibrium
constraints by directly exploiting (and preserving) the hierarchical,
multi-agent structure of the original aggregative game.
Notation
N, R and R≥0 denote the set of natural, real and nonnegative
real numbers. 1 represents a vector with all elements equal to 1. For
vectors v1, . . . , vN ∈ Rn and I = {1, . . . , N}, we denote v :=
(v>1 , . . . , v>N )
> = col({vi}i∈I) and v−i := col({vj}j∈I\{i}). We
also use v = (vi,v−i). v ⊥ w means that v and w are orthogonal
vectors. Given a matrix A ∈ Rm×n, A> denotes its transpose. A⊗B
represents the Kronecker product between the matrices A and B. For
a function f : Rn × Rn → R, f(v; v¯) denotes the approximation of
f at some v¯. For a set-valued mapping F : Rn ⇒ Rm, gph(F) :=
{(y, x) ∈ Rn × Rm | x ∈ F(y)} denotes its graph.
II. MATHEMATICAL SETUP
A. Stackelberg game
We consider a hierarchical noncooperative game with one leader,
controlling its decision variable y0 ∈ Rn0 , and N followers, indexed
by the set I := {1, . . . , N}, where each follower i ∈ I controls its
own variable xi ∈ Xi := {xi ∈ Rni | Fixi ≤ gi}, Fi ∈ Rpi×ni ,
gi ∈ Rpi , and aims at solving the following optimization problem:
∀i ∈ I :
 minxi∈Xi Ji(y0, xi,x−i)s.t. Aixi +∑j∈I\{i}Ajxj ≤ b, (1)
for some cost function Ji : Rn0 × Rn → R. Let x :=
col({xi}i∈I) ∈ Rn, n =
∑
i∈I ni, be the collective vector of
strategies of the followers, while x−i ∈ Rn−ni stacks all the local
decision variables except the i-th one. We postulate the following
standard assumptions on the followers’ data in (1).
Standing Assumption 1: For each i ∈ I, the function Ji(y0, ·) is
convex and continuously differentiable, for fixed y0. 
Standing Assumption 2: For each i ∈ I, rank(Fi) = pi. 
In (1), each matrix Ai ∈ Rm×ni stacks m linear coupling
constraints, while b ∈ Rm is the vector of shared resources among the
followers. Let A := [A1 . . . AN ] ∈ Rm×n. Then, we preliminary
define the sets X := ∏i∈I Xi and Θ := {x ∈ X | Ax ≤ b}.
For a fixed strategy of the leader, y0, the followers aim to
solve a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Specifi-
cally, by focusing on v-GNE, such problem is equivalent to solve
VI(Θ, H(y0, ·)) [23], where, in view of Standing Assumption 1,
H : Rn0 × Rn ⇒ Rn is a continuously differentiable set-valued
mapping defined as H (y0,x) := col({∇xiJi (y0,x)}i∈I). This
fact, along with the properties of Θ, guarantee the nonemptiness of
the set of v-GNE that, for any y0 ∈ Y0, corresponds to the set
S(y0) := {x ∈ Θ | (z − x)>H(y0,x) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Θ}. (2)
On the other hand, the optimization problem of the leader reads as:{
min
y0,x
J0(y0,x)
s.t. (y0,x) ∈ gph(S) ∩ (Y0 × Rn),
(3)
for some cost function J0 : Rn0 ×Rn → R and local constraint set
Y0 characterized by the following standard conditions.
Standing Assumption 3: The set Y0 is nonempty, closed and con-
vex. 
Standing Assumption 4: The function J0 is coercive, its gradient
∇J0 is Lipschitz continuous on Φ := Y0 ×X with constant κ0. 
We note that (3) defines an MPEC where x is not strictly within
the leaders control, but it corresponds to an optimistic conjecture
[18]. In view of [8, Th. 1.4.1], the MPEC in (3) admits an optimal
solution, since the coerciveness of J0 implies compactness of its level
sets, and the feasible set, gph(S) ∩ (Y0 × Rn), is closed under the
postulated assumptions. Therefore, this ensures existence of a solution
to the hierarchical game, according to the following notion of local
generalized Stackelberg equilibrium, inspired by [18], [28].
Definition 1: A pair (y∗0 ,x∗) ∈ gph(S) ∩ (Y0 × Rn), with S as
in (2), is a local Stackelberg equilibrium (`-SE) of the hierarchical
game in (1)–(3) if there exist open neighborhoods Oy∗0 and Ox∗ of
y∗0 and x∗, respectively, such that
J0(y
∗
0 ,x
∗) ≤ inf
(y0,x)∈gph(S)∩O
J0(y0,x),
where O := (Y0 ∩ Oy∗0 )×Ox∗ . 
Informally speaking, at an `-SE, the leader and the followers locally
fulfill the set of mutually coupling constraints and none of them can
gain by unilaterally deviating from their current strategy. Note that
we refer to an SE if Definition 1 holds true with O = Y0×Rn, i.e.,
Oy∗0 = R
n0 and Ox∗ = Rn, thus coinciding with [18, Def. 1.1].
B. Aggregative game formulation
For computational purposes, we consider the cost function of the
followers and leader to be in aggregative form, i.e.,
Ji :=
1
2x
>
i Qixi +
(
1
N
∑
j∈I Ci,jxj + Ci,0y0
)>
xi, ∀i ∈ I,
J0 := f0 (y0) +
(∑
i∈I f0,i(xi)
)>
y0,
(4)
where Qi < 0, Ci,j ∈ Rni×nj , and Ci,0 ∈ Rni×n0 . In view of
Standing Assumption 1, given any feasible y0 ∈ Y0, it follows from
[29, Th. 3.1] that a set of strategies is a v-GNE of the followers game
in (1) if and only if the following coupled KKT conditions hold true: ∇xiJi (y0, xi,x−i) +A
>
i λ+ F
>
i λi = 0, ∀i ∈ I,
0 ≤ λ ⊥ −(Ax− b) ≥ 0,
0 ≤ λi ⊥ −(Fixi − gi) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I,
which, in our aggregative setup, can be compactly rewritten as Qx+ Cy0 +A
>λ+ F>λ = 0,
0 ≤ λ ⊥ −(Ax− b) ≥ 0,
0 ≤ λi ⊥ −(Fixi − gi) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I,
(5)
where F := diag({Fi}i∈I), λ ∈ Rm≥0 is the dual variable associated
with Ax ≤ b, λi ∈ Rpi≥0 is the (local) dual variable associated with
the local constraints defining Xi, λ := col({λi}i∈I), and
Q :=
 Q1 +
1
NC1,1 · · · 1NC1,N
...
. . .
...
1
NCN,1 · · · QN + 1NCN,N
 , C :=
 C10...
CN0
 .
Finally, by substituting back the KKT conditions in (5) into the
optimization problem of the leader in (3), the problem of finding an
SE of the hierarchical game in (1)–(3) can be equivalently written as
min
y0,x,λ,λ
J0(y0,x)
s.t. Qx+ Cy0 +A
>λ+ F>λ = 0,
0 ≤ λi ⊥ −(Fixi − gi) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I,
0 ≤ λ ⊥ −(Ax− b) ≥ 0, y0 ∈ Y0.
(6)
3C. Complementarity constraints relaxation
We note that the leader nonconvex optimization problem in (6) is
an MPCC and, in general, it does not satisfy any standard constraint
qualification. Therefore, we propose to study a regularized version
by introducing slack variables µ ∈ Rm≥0 and µi ∈ Rpi≥0, i ∈ I,
together with parameters θ, θi > 0, i ∈ I, which enable us to replace
the complementarity constraints in (6) with the nonlinear constraints
λ>µ ≤ θ and λ>i µi ≤ θi, for all i ∈ I [24]. Thus, after defining ν :=
col(λ, µ) ∈ R2m, νi := col(λi, µi) ∈ R2pi , y := col(x, {νi}i∈I),
the regularized version of (6) reads as:
R(θ) :

min
y0,y,ν
J0(y0,x)
s.t. Af y +A` y0 +Ac ν = d,
λ>i µi ≤ θi, λi, µi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I,
λ>µ ≤ θ, λ, µ ≥ 0, y0 ∈ Y0,
(7)
where d := col(0, b, g), g := col({gi}i∈I), A` := col(C, 0, 0), and
Af :=
 Q {[F>i 0]}i∈IA 0
F [0 I]⊗ 1
 , Ac :=
 A> 00 I
0 0
 .
For any given θ, θi > 0, i ∈ I, let us now introduce the sets
C(θ) := {ν ∈ R2m≥0 | 12ν>Pν ≤ θ},
Ci(θi) := {νi ∈ R2pi≥0 | 12ν>i Piνi ≤ θi}, ∀i ∈ I.
(8)
Here, each P and Pi, i ∈ I, is a symmetric matrix with identities
of suitable dimension on the anti-diagonal. Furthermore, we define
Ω(θ) := Y0 ×Y × C(θ), where for brevity we omit the dependency
from θi, explicated in Y := X×
∏
i∈I Ci(θi). Finally, by introducing
ω := col(y0,y, ν) and Aω := [A` Af Ac], the closed, nonconvex
feasible set of R(θ) in (7) reads as
R(θ) := {ω ∈ Ω(θ) | Aω ω − d = 0}. (9)
We recall now the notion of MPCC-LICQ for the MPCC in (6),
which is characterized by the result stated immediately below.
Definition 2: The MPCC in (6) satisfies the MPCC-LICQ at ω˜ ∈
R(0) if R(0) in (7) satisfies the LICQ at ω˜. 
Lemma 1: ([24, Lemma 2.1]) Let ω˜ ∈ R(0). If ω˜ satisfies
the MPCC-LICQ for the MPCC in (6), then there exists an open
neighborhood O of ω˜ and scalars θ˜, θ˜i > 0, for all i ∈ I, such that,
for every θ ∈ (0, θ˜) and θi ∈ (0, θ˜i), for all i ∈ I, the LICQ holds
true at every point ω ∈ O of R(θ). 
Then, let us introduce the following fundamental assumption.
Standing Assumption 5: There exists some ω˜ ∈ R(0) that satisfies
the MPCC-LICQ for the MPCC in (6). The regularization parameters
are chosen so that θ ∈ (0, θ˜) and θi ∈ (0, θ˜i), for all i ∈ I. 
In view of Standing Assumption 5, there exists a neighborhood
such that R(θ) locally satisfies the LICQ. As shown in §IV-B, the
coefficients θ, θi, i ∈ I, play a trade-off role between the distance
from a v-GNE for the followers and a lower cost for the leader.
To conclude the section, we stress that an optimal solution to (7),
whose existence follows by its local LICQ and the coerciveness of
J0, generates a pair (y∗0 ,x∗) that corresponds to an `-SE of the
original hierarchical game in (1)–(3).
III. LOCAL STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
VIA SEQUENTIAL CONVEX APPROXIMATION
A. A two-layer algorithm
In the spirit of [26], [27], we then investigate how to solve (7)
in a decentralized fashion by means of a two-layer algorithm, while
preserving the hierarchical structure of the game (1)–(3). First, we
linearize the nonlinear terms appearing in the cost function around
some ω¯ ∈ R(θ). Specifically, with ϕ := (y0,x), J0 is linearized
by following a first order Taylor expansion as J0(ϕ) ' J0(ϕ¯) +
∇>J0(ϕ¯) (ϕ− ϕ¯) where, for our aggregative game, we have:
∇J0(ϕ)=col(∇y0f0(y0)+
∑
j∈I f0,j(xj),{∇xj f0,j(xj)>y0}j∈I)
=:col(c`(y0,x), cf(y0,x)).
According to [27, §III.A], for the nonlinear constraints defining the
sets in (8), we compute an upper approximation by observing that,
e.g., 12ν
>Pν = λ>µ = 12 (λ+µ)
>(λ+µ)− 12 (λ>λ+µ>µ). Thus,
after linearizing the concave term around some ν¯ ∈ C(θ), we define
C˜(θ; ω¯) := {ν ∈ R2m≥0 | 12 (1>ν)>(1>ν)− ν¯>ν + 12 ν¯>ν¯ ≤ θ}.
The same procedure can be applied to each Ci(θi) to obtain C˜i(θi; ω¯).
Accordingly, Ω(θ) is approximated by Ω˜(θ; ω¯) := Y0 × Y˜(ω¯) ×
C˜(θ; ω¯), with Y˜(ω¯) := X ×∏i∈I C˜i(θi; ω¯), while R(θ) by
R˜(θ; ω¯) := {ω ∈ Ω˜(θ; ω¯) | Aω ω − d = 0}. (10)
Finally, by discarding constant terms and introducing cω(ω¯) :=
col(∇J0(ϕ¯), 0), the convexified version of R(θ) in (7) reads as
R˜ (θ; ω¯) :
 minω∈Ω˜(θ;ω¯) cω(ω¯)
>ω + σ
2
‖ω − ω¯‖2
s.t. Aω ω = d,
(11)
where we add a “proximal-like” term to the linearized cost function in
(7) with σ > 0. Hence, the cost function in (11), namely J˜0(ω; ω¯) :=
cω(ω¯)
>ω + σ2 ‖ω − ω¯‖2, is characterized as follows.
Lemma 2: The following statements hold true:
(i) Given any ω¯ ∈ R(θ), J˜0(· ; ω¯) is uniformly strongly convex on
Φ× R2(m+p)≥0 , p :=
∑
i∈I pi, with coefficient σ;
(ii) Given any ω ∈ R(θ), ∇J˜0(ω; ·) is uniformly Lipschitz contin-
uous on R(θ) with coefficient κ˜0 := κ0 + σ.

Proof: (i) The statement directly follows by applying the
definition of uniform strong convexity on the set Φ× R2(m+p)≥0 .
(ii) Let ω1,ω2 ∈ R(θ). For any given ω ∈ R(θ), we have:
‖∇J˜0(ω;ω1)−∇J˜0(ω;ω2)‖=‖cω(ω1)−cω(ω2)+σ(ω2−ω1)‖
≤ ‖col(∇J0(ϕ1), 0)−col(∇J0(ϕ2), 0)‖+σ‖ω1 − ω2‖
≤ (κ0 + σ) ‖ω1 − ω2‖.
Remark 1: According to the structure of the vector ω, the coeffi-
cient σ may be replaced with locally defined σ0, σc, σi > 0, i ∈ I,
without affecting the results given in the remainder, see [26, §III.A].
For simplicity, we adopt a unique, globally known parameter σ. 
Thus, given any ω¯ ∈ R(θ), R˜ (θ; ω¯) in (11) admits a unique
optimal solution associated with the mapping ωˆ : Rs → Rs, with
s := n0 + n+ 2(p+m), defined as follows:
ωˆ(ω¯) := argmin
ω∈R˜(θ;ω¯)
J˜0(ω; ω¯). (12)
For computing an `-SE, we propose the iterative procedure sum-
marized in Algorithm 1, which is composed of two main loops and
resorts on the so called SCA method. Specifically, once fixed the
coefficients θ, θi > 0, for all i ∈ I, at each iteration k ∈ N, the
outer loop is in charge of providing a feasible set of strategies ωk,
which are used to convexify R(θ) (S1). Then, after solving the inner
loop by computing the optimal solution ωˆk := ωˆ(ωk) to R˜(θ;ωk)
(S2), the outer loop updates the strategies ωk+1 (S3) to find a new
approximation R˜(θ;ωk+1), and the procedure repeats until a certain
stopping criterion is met.
4Algorithm 1: Two-layer SCA computation of `-SE
Initialization: ω0 ∈ R(θ), α > 0
Iteration (k ∈ N):
(S1) Convexify R(θ) to obtain R˜(θ;ωk) as in (11)
(S2) Compute ωˆk, solution to R˜(θ;ωk)
(S3) Update ωk+1 = (1− α)ωk + αωˆk
B. Convergence analysis
First, we characterize the sequence (ωk)k∈N generated by Al-
gorithm 1 in terms of iterate feasibility. Then, we establish a key
property of the mapping ωˆ(·), and finally we prove that (ωk)k∈N
converges to an optimal solution to (7), generating an `-SE of the
hierarchical aggregative game (1)–(3), according to Definition 1.
Lemma 3: The following inclusions hold true:
(i) R˜(θ; ω¯) ⊆ R(θ), for all ω¯ ∈ R(θ);
(ii) ωk ∈ R(θ).

Proof: (i) The upper approximation of the nonlinear constraints,
which holds true for all ω¯ ∈ R(θ), implies C˜(θ; ω¯) ⊆ C(θ) and
C˜i(θi; ω¯) ⊆ Ci(θi), i ∈ I. Therefore, Ω˜(θ; ω¯) ⊆ Ω(θ), and in view
of the definitions in (9) and (10), inclusion (i) can be deduced.
(ii) First, in view of the approximation of the constraints, note
that ωk ∈ R˜(θ;ωk), for all k ∈ N, with R˜(θ;ωk) convex subset
of R(θ). Then, the proof follows by induction by considering that
ωk+1 is a convex combination of ωˆk ∈ R˜(θ;ωk) and ωk.
Lemma 4: For every ω¯ ∈ R(θ), the vector (ϕˆ(ω¯) − ϕ¯) is a
descent direction for J0(ϕ) in R(θ), evaluated at ϕ¯, i.e., (ϕ¯ −
ϕˆ(ω¯))>∇J0(ϕ¯) ≥ σ‖ω¯ − ωˆ(ω¯)‖2 > 0. 
Proof: Given any ω¯ ∈ R(θ), by definition, ωˆ(ω¯) satisfies the
minimum principle for (11), i.e., (ζ − ωˆ(ω¯))>∇J˜0(ωˆ(ω¯); ω¯) ≥ 0
for all ζ ∈ R˜(θ; ω¯). From Lemma 3(ii), we choose ζ = ω¯, and by
adding and subtracting the term (ω¯−ωˆ(ω¯))>∇J˜0(ω¯; ω¯), we obtain
(ω¯ − ωˆ(ω¯))>∇J˜0(ω¯; ω¯) ≥
(ω¯ − ωˆ(ω¯))>(∇J˜0(ω¯; ω¯)−∇J˜0(ωˆ(ω¯); ω¯))
By directly replacing∇J˜0(ω¯; ω¯) with cω(ω¯) = col(∇J0(ϕ¯), 0), the
term on the left-hand side is equal to (ϕ¯− ϕˆ(ω¯))>∇J0(ϕ¯), while
the one on the right-hand side, in view of Lemma 2(i), is bounded
from below by σ‖ω¯ − ωˆ(ω¯)‖2, leading to
(ϕ¯− ϕˆ(ω¯))>∇J0(ϕ¯) ≥ σ‖ω¯ − ωˆ(ω¯)‖2.
Before establishing the convergence to an `-SE for the sequence
generated by Algorithm 1, we recall a key result provided in [27].
Lemma 5: ([27, Th. 14]) Let (ωk)k∈N be the sequence generated
by Algorithm 1 and assume that limk→∞ ‖ωˆ(ωk)−ωk‖ = 0. Then,
every limit point of (ωk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 1 is a stationary
solution to R(θ). 
Theorem 1: Let α in Algorithm 1 be chosen so that α ∈
(0, 2σ/κ0). Then, the sequence (ωk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 1
converges to an optimal solution ω∗ to R(θ) in (7), which subvector
(y∗0 ,x∗) is an `-SE of the hierarchical game in (1)–(3). 
Proof: By combining the descent lemma [30, Prop. A.24] and
Lemma 4, the step (S3) in Algorithm 1 leads to:
J0(ϕ
k+1) ≤ J0(ϕk) + α∇>J0(ϕk)(ϕˆ(ωk)−ϕk)
+ α2 κ02 ‖ϕˆ(ωk)−ϕk‖2
≤ J0(ϕk)− α
(
σ − ακ02
) ‖ωˆ(ωk)− ωk‖2,
Algorithm 2: ADAL for (S2) of Algorithm 1
Initialization: η(0) ∈ Rs, τ, ρ > 0
Iteration (t ∈ N):
• Leader: y
?
0(t) = argmin
y0∈Y0
Lˆk` (y0, η(t), zf(t), zc(t))
z`(t+ 1) = z`(t) + τ(A` y
?
0(t)− z`(t))
• Followers: y
?(t) = argmin
y∈Y˜k
Lˆkf (y, η(t), z`(t), zc(t))
zf(t+ 1) = zf(t) + τ(Af y
?(t)− zf(t))
• Coordinator: ν
?(t) = argmin
ν∈C˜k(θ)
Lˆkc (ν, η(t), zf(t), z`(t))
zc(t+ 1) = zc(t) + τ
(
Ac ν
?(t)− zc(t)
)
η(t+ 1) = η(t) + ρτ (zf(t+ 1) + z`(t+ 1) + zc(t+ 1)− d)
where the second inequality follows from ‖ωˆ(ωk) − ωk‖ ≥
‖ϕˆ(ωk) − ϕk‖. If α < 2σ/κ0, then (J0(ϕk))k∈N shall converge
to a finite value, since J0(ϕk) → −∞ can not happen in view
of Standing Assumption 4. Thus, the convergence of (J0(ϕk))k∈N
implies limk→∞ ‖ωˆ(ωk) − ωk‖ = 0, and therefore the bounded
sequence (ωk)k∈N ∈ R(θ) in view of Lemma 3, and has a limit point
in R(θ). From Lemma 5, such a limit point is a stationary solution to
R(θ), and since (J0(ϕk))k∈N is a strictly decreasing sequence, no
limit point can be a local maximum of J0. Thus, (ωk)k∈N converges
to an optimal solution ω∗ to (7), which subvector (y∗0 ,x∗) is an `-SE
of the original hierarchical game in (1)–(3).
Remark 2: If the parameters σ and κ0 are not globally known,
Theorem 1 can be equivalently restated according to a vanishing step-
size rule, i.e., α = αk that shall be chosen so that αk ∈ (0, 1], for
all k ∈ N, αk → 0 and ∑k∈N αk = +∞. 
C. An augmented Lagrangian approach to solve the inner loop
A scalable and privacy-preserving algorithm, suitable to solve (S2)
in Algorithm 1 by exploiting the hierarchical structure of the original
game, is the accelerated distributed augmented Lagrangian (ADAL)
method proposed in [31]. Since we are interested in finding the
optimal solution to R˜(θ;ωk), from now on we omit the dependence
on ωk (unless differently specified) to alleviate the notation.
Thus, at every iteration k ∈ N of the outer loop, the Lagrangian
function associated to (11) is defined as
Lk(ω, ν) = (ckω)>ω + σ
2
‖ω − ωk‖2 + η>(Aω ω − d), (13)
where ckω := cω(ωk), and ν ∈ Rl, l := n + m + p, is the dual
variable associated with the linear equality constraints. Note that the
Lagrangian in (13) can be rewritten as the sum of terms associated
to different entities, which happens to correspond to leader, the set
of followers, and a central coordinator, respectively. In details, we
define Lk` := (ck` )>y0 + σ2 ‖y0−yk0‖2 +η>A` y0, Lkf := (ckf )>y+
σ
2 ‖y − yk‖2 + η>Af y, and Lkc := σ2 ‖ν − νk‖2 + η>Ac ν. In
light of [31], we augment each one of these terms as, e.g., Lˆkf :=
Lkf + ρ2‖Af y+A` y0 +Ac ν−d‖2 (Lˆk` and Lˆkc are identical), where
ρ > 0 is a penalty term to be designed freely.
The main steps of the proposed semi-decentralized procedure
are summarized in Algorithm 2, where we emphasize that each
5augmented Lagrangian term depends on the linearization at the
current outer iteration k ∈ N. Specifically, at every iteration t ∈ N of
the inner loop, the ADAL requires that the followers, the leader and
the central coordinator compute in parallel a minimization step of
the local augmented Lagrangian. Here, z` := A` y0, zf := Af y and
zc := Ac ν are auxiliary variables introduced for privacy purposes
and, given some τ > 0, are locally updated. Finally, the central
coordinator, which in some practical applications may eventually
coincide with the leader, gathers z`(t + 1) and zf(t + 1) from the
leader and followers, and updates the dual variable.
Proposition 1: Let ρ > 0 be sufficiently large and τ ∈ (0, r−1max),
where rmax corresponds to the maximum degree among the con-
straints in (10). Then, the sequence (ω(t))t∈N generated by Algo-
rithm 2 converges to the minimizer of R˜(θ;ωk), for all k ∈ N. 
Proof: The proof follows by noticing that R˜(θ;ωk) satisfies
the assumptions in [31, Th. 2], for all k ∈ N. Specifically, R˜(θ;ωk)
is a closed and convex set, J˜0(ω;ωk) is inf-compact and each one
of its terms is twice continuously differentiable. Finally, Lemma 1
provides the local LICQ for R(θ), directly inherited by R˜(θ;ωk).
Remark 3: For simplicity, we adopt a common τ to update the
auxiliary variables z`, zf and zc. In principle, each entity involved
within the ADAL in Algorithm 2 can locally set its own step size
according to the degree of each constraint in (11), see [31, §II.A]. 
IV. NUMERICAL CASE STUDY: CHARGING
COORDINATION OF PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLES
A. Numerical simulation setup
We consider a set of PEVs (followers), I := {1, 2, . . . , N},
which has to be charged over a certain horizon T := {1, . . . , T}.
All PEVs are connected to an aggregator (leader, e.g., a retailer),
which manages the energy requirements of the fleet by purchasing
the electricity from the wholesale energy market. Let us define
xi := col({xji}j∈T ), and p := col({pj}j∈T ) as the amount of
requested energy by the fleet and the price of energy over time,
i.e., the strategy of the i-th follower and of the leader, respectively.
For every PEV i ∈ I, we consider the cost function Ji(p,x) =
qix
>
i xi + c
>
i xi −
(
−six>i xi + κ>i xi + p>xi
)
+ δ ‖xi − σ(x)‖2 ,
where x := col({xi}i∈I), qi, ci > 0 depend on the nominal voltage
and on the capacity loss of each battery, while κi, si > 0 model
the battery size and the satisfaction of the i-th PEV for charging the
amount xi. Moreover, the term (qix>i xi+ c
>
i xi) denotes the battery
degradation cost, (−six>i xi+κ>i xi+p>xi) the benefit for charging
[32], and δ‖xi − σ(x)‖2 a penalty for deviating from the average
charging profile, σ(x) := 1N 1
>x, with δ > 0. On the other hand,
the leader aims at maximizing the following cost function
J0(p,x) = −p> (D + σ(x)) , (14)
which represents the economic benefit for charging the PEVs, where
D ∈ RT is the total non-PEV demand over time. We assume that
the net energy available for the PEVs is fixed, and therefore the
overall PEV demand shall meet the capacity constraint 1N 1
>x ≤
C, for some C > 0. Furthermore, we assume that, at every time
step, xi ∈ [xi, xi], for all i ∈ I. Thus, given the amount of energy
requested by the PEVs, the retailer chooses a price p per unit of
energy, with p ∈ [0, p], aiming at maximizing its revenue in (14).
For the numerical simulations, we consider N = 104 PEVs, a
charging horizon discretized into T = 24 time intervals, qi =
1.2 · 10−3, ci = 0.11, while κi and si are randomly drawn from
N (12, 2) and U(0.02, 0.1) respectively, while the capacity upper
bound C is equal to 1.5 from 11pm to 8am, and to 0.5 for the
rest of the day. The convergence behavior of Algorithm 1 over 10
Algorithm 3: Two-layer naı¨ve method for `-SE computation
Initialization: y0(0) ∈ Y0
Iteration (k ∈ N):
(S1) Compute an v-GNE, x(k), for the game in (1)
(S2) Compute y∗0(k), solution to (3)
(S3) Update y0(k) := (1− β(k))y0(k − 1) + β(k)y∗0(k)
Fig. 1. Comparison of the convergence behavior between Algorithm 1
(solid blue line) and 3 (dotted red line).
experiments is shown in Fig. 1. During the numerical simulations, the
inner loop takes between 50 and 75 iterations (on average) to meet a
predefined stopping condition, and above 102 experiments, we did not
experienced any influence on the outer loop convergence behavior.
For this latter, in view of the fact that limk→∞ ‖ωˆ(ωk)−ωk‖ = 0,
we have chosen ‖ωˆk − ωˆk−1‖ ≤ 10−4 as stopping criterion.
The procedure proposed in Algorithm 1 is then compared with
the simplest naı¨ve method for possibly computing an `-SE, which
main steps are summarized in Algorithm 3. Specifically, given the
strategy of the leader at the previous step, the followers compute
an v-GNE of the game in (1), and send their strategy back to
the leader (S1). In turn, the leader first solves its optimization
problem in (3) with solution y∗0(k) (S2), and then updates its strategy
taking a convex combination between y∗0(k) and the strategy at the
previous step, where the parameter β(k) ∈ [0, 1] introduces a possible
inertia (S3). Note that, albeit rather intuitive, this naı¨ve algorithm
has no converge guarantees. However, in our numerical experience,
by considering the cost function in (14) for the leader and setting
β(k) = 1/k, Algorithm 3 apparently shows a slower convergent
behavior compared with the proposed Algorithm 1, as depicted in
Fig. 1 over 10 numerical experiments.
B. The trade-off between the leader and the followers
Finally, we highlight the trade-off role played by the relaxation
parameter θ in (7). In fact, for θ sufficiently large, the leader has a
larger feasible set while, on the other hand, the followers are farther
away from an v-GNE, since the complementarity condition is not
exactly satisfied. Therefore, the larger the θ, the lower the optimal
cost of the leader, and possibly the larger the optimal cost of each
follower. Vice versa, the smaller θ, the higher the optimal cost of the
leader, because his feasible set shrinks, and possibly the lower the
optimal cost of each follower, since the equilibrium condition is closer
6Fig. 2. Trade-off role played by the regularization parameter θ.
to being satisfied. This behavior is essentially confirmed in Fig. 2
where, for ease of visualization, we show the normalized benefit
of the leader (J?0 (θ)) and the normalized maximum disadvantage
among the followers (∆J?(θ)) as θ increases. Specifically, for each
θ ∈ [θ, 1], we compute an `-SE, and we denote with J?0 (θ) the
corresponding optimal cost for the leader. For the followers, we
introduce and show the maximum relative disadvantage with respect
to a near-equilibrium condition, i.e., ∆J?(θ) := maxi∈I J?i (θ) −
J?i (θ), where, for a given θ, J
?
i (θ) is the optimal cost for the i-th
follower, while in this case we set θ equal to 10−6.
V. CONCLUSION
We have considered a multi-agent, hierarchical equilibrium prob-
lem with one leader and multiple followers, with possibly nonconvex
data for the leader, convex-quadratic objective functions and linear
constraints for the followers, and overall an aggregative structure.
In this setup, a local Stackelberg equilibrium can be approximated
arbitrarily close via the relaxation of the complementarity condition
that represents the equilibrium among the followers. In turn, the
relaxed problem can be solved via a two-layer algorithm, which
- thanks to the aggregative structure - requires semi-decentralized
computations and information exchange.
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